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This paper examines the institutional output and preliminary outcome of the European Union (EU) 
Patients’ Rights Directive in two healthcare models: the Beveridge and Bismarcian models in Denmark 
and Bulgaria, respectively. The study applies a most dissimilar system design to explain a similar 
transposition output through three explanatory variables, namely, institutional misfit, salience and 
administrative resources. We find that Denmark and Bulgaria have transposed the Directive in 
protectionist and minimalistic ways, thus far leading to a low outcome, i.e., low patient outflow. The 
encounter between the European Union (EU) and the national healthcare models has not been 
enthusiastic but has instead been another example of reluctant and restrictive Europeanisation.  
  
Introduction 
Transposition as a process and its eventual output and outcome are conditioned by many factors that 
form a member state’s polities, policies and politics. As a result, we can expect that similar systems will 
have analogous transpositions because similar systems are influenced by comparable factors. Accordingly, 
the greater the variation is among member states’ systems, the greater the differentiation of their 
transposition outputs is likely to be. This paper examines this expectation in the case of the Directive 
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2011/24/EU on Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Health Care (the Directive) and its transposition to the 
healthcare systems of Denmark and Bulgaria. Because the two countries differ in almost every aspect, 
from overall institutional set up, through salience of the Directive, to resources available in the system, we 
can expect that transposition output and outcome will differ between the two systems. Our findings, 
however, show that this is not the case. The output is similar, and the preliminary outcome in both 
member states is low.  
We conceptualise our dependent variable, transposition output, as the transposing acts’ ability to achieve 
the goals of the Directive. To assess the quality of transposition and, thus, the transposition output, we 
examine the transposing acts’ provisions on six central articles of the Directive. We seek to determine 
whether the provisions adopted nationally provide a sufficient legislative basis for fulfilling the goals of 
the Directive. Thus, our dependent variable is defined as the ‘quality of transposition’, meaning the 
adequacy of national transposition measures to fulfil the goals of the Directive. We argue that despite its 
more evaluative nature, the quality of transposition output is important to examine because it is likely to 
condition the outcome of EU law. Outcome is defined as the de facto inflow or outflow of EU patients 
across borders.  
Transposition output may differ among protectionist, minimalist or opportunistic typologies. A 
protectionist transposition output is restrictive. It intends to preserve the institutional status quo of the 
national setting, thus intending to limit the cross border inflow and outflow of patients. A protectionist 
output will result in low outcome, i.e., patient mobility. A minimalist transposition output is also 
restrictive but not because of an active counter-response. Instead, a minimalist output occurs because of 
neglect or insufficient time and resources vested in transposition. However, this output will also result in 
low outcome. Finally, transposition output may be opportunistic, intending to benefit from the new 
opportunities the Directive offers and minimising national control over patient inflow while investing in 
attracting patient inflow. The outcome of an opportunistic transposition output is likely to be high patient 
flows.  
Our approach in analysing transposition quality distinguishes our study from the majority of publications 
on transposition in the European Union (EU). While the majority of these publications primarily focus on 
meeting transposition deadlines and are conducted through quantitative methods (Dimitrova & Toshkov 
2009; Sprungk 2013; Steunenberg & Kaeding 2009), our approach goes further in examining the adequacy 
of transposition in fulfilling the objectives of a directive. To simply measure transposition timeliness tells 
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us little concerning subsequent outcomes. Because we examine two vastly different systems, our study 
provides a deeper understanding of similar transposition outcomes among different systems. 
We expect output and outcome to be influenced by three conditioning factors, namely, institutional fit, 
salience and administrative resources. Our cases vary in all three of these variables, which leads us to 
expect different transposition outputs and outcomes. The institutional misfit is greater in Denmark than in 
Bulgaria; therefore, we can expect better transposition in Bulgaria. We could expect that this would also 
make the Directive more salient in Denmark than in Bulgaria. The general assumption is that where the 
salience of the Directive is high, transposition is more successful. Thus, on the basis of salience, we should 
expect transposition to be better in Denmark (following Versluis 2007). Finally, administrative resources 
are higher in Denmark than in Bulgaria. Generally, the transposition literature finds that better 
administrative resources lead to better transposition. Thus, we should expect better transposition in 
Denmark than in Bulgaria.  
This study proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the methodology of our study. The paper follows a 
most dissimilar systems design (MDSD). Next, we introduce our three theoretical expectations based on 
the state of the art within the literature on transposition. Against this background, we proceed to the 
analysis of transposition in our two different health systems. Finally, we present our findings on both 
output and preliminary outcome. 
 
Methodology 
Our cases are selected based on their fundamentally different systems. Therefore, our case selection 
prompts the use of the MDSD approach. MDSD has been widely discussed in the literature on social 
inquiry and the methods of case studies (Anckar 2008; Kinget al. 1994; Lijphart 1971; Rihoux 2006) since 
its introduction in 1970 by Prezwoski and Teune (Przeworski & Teune 1970). The basic logic of the 
approach involves a comparison of systems that share as many dissimilarities as possible yet show the 
same outcome. This logic allows the researchers to control for every variable that differs between the 
systems and to exclude the variable as a possible explanation. If the cases demonstrate divergence on all 
possible variables, then these variables could not possibly explain a convergent result. If, in contrast, the 
cases share a common factor(s), these commonalities constitute an explanation for similar outcomes. 
Rihoux describes the strength of the method by stating that it considers many potential explanatory 
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variables or conditions that are systematically grouped in categories, producing a reduction in complexity 
(Rihoux 2006: 686).  
The examination of transposition in two selected member states has applied the process-tracing method 
to conduct an in-depth analysis of a process of change as it unfolded. Thus, this paper is a qualitative, 
comparative study of two cases. The qualitative case study method is useful to examine how and to what 
extent different healthcare models are challenged and change as a result of an EU cause. The case study 
method is well-equipped to uncover complex inter-institutional dynamics because it provides a better 
opportunity to obtain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation (Collier et al. 2004: 87). 
The deficit of the method is often the small-n, whereas the advantages are that the method enables the 
researcher to examine the details and causal factors of a single unit – and compare it with others (Gerring 
2004: 348). The case study constitutes a method capable of addressing the causal complexity often found 
when European policies are created in areas of high political salience, when such policies evolve and when 
they impact nationally in a diverse and complex manner such as the present case of national healthcare 
models and the EU (George & Bennett 2005: 19-22).  Process tracing identifies the causal chain between 
an independent variable (X) and a dependent variable (Y) and thus identifies the explanatory factors 
assumed to connect X and Y (George and Bennett 2005: 206-207). The method is therefore particularly 
useful when one addresses causal interference in qualitative research (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 2).  
The empirical data for this study were collected as part of a larger comparative research project 
examining the current dynamics of EU social policy, including healthcare and its subsequent 
implementation. This study consists of two main data sources. 1) The first data source is documents 
covering both the EU legislative process and the transposition in the selected member states. These 
documents include newspaper articles, position papers, national laws, decrees and contributions to the 
hearings. 2) The second data source is a large collection of qualitative interviews that were held with key 
respondents in the two member states as well as representatives from the Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament during negotiations over the Directive. The key respondents in the member 
states were civil servants in charge of the transposition from the relevant ministries, regional politicians 
and civil servants, representatives from patient organisations, boards for patient complaints, and 
representatives from the involved healthcare agencies, among others.  A total of 54 semi-structured 





Institutionally, the two systems have developed differently. Denmark is structured along the Beveridgian, 
tax-funded, universalist model and is a National Health Service system (NHS), whereas Bulgaria has a 
Bismarckian, mixed social-insurance and tax-funded corporatist model and is a Social Health Insurance 
(SHI) system. This considerable institutional variation between the two cases means that the systems’ fit 
with the Directive also varies. The misfit hypothesis has held a prominent position in Europeanisation 
studies since the late 1990s, when it was introduced by Duina. The misfit hypothesis’s underlying logic 
emphasises the comparability between EU rules and the national institutions they target. When a directive 
demands major transformations in these institutions, implementation suffers (Duina 1997: 157). Since the 
late 1990s, the misfit hypothesis has been prolifically used in studies regarding national compliance with 
European legislation (Cowlesset al. 2001; Duina 1997; Héritier 1995; Steunenberg & Toshkov 2009). 
From this basic premise, we expect transposition in Denmark to be more restrictive (protectionist or 
minimalist) because of the greater misfit between the Directive and the Danish healthcare system.  
This observation is made by both Obermaier and Kostera who examine Denmark’s compliance with the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s decisions on patient mobility compared with  Bismarckian 
healthcare systems in Europe. Obermaier compares Denmark in a broader European context and 
concludes that, in general, NHS systems seem to be far worse regarding compliance with the patient 
mobility principles stipulated by the CJEU (Obermaier 2009: 84). A comparable conclusion is reached by 
Kostera in a direct comparison between Denmark and the prototypical Bismarckian system in Germany. 
Kostera finds that the institutional misfit between Denmark’s system and CJEU decisions precluded a 
simple absorption of European obligations and that Denmark experienced a much higher adaptive 
pressure (Kostera 2008: 28).  
Although much discussed, the insufficiency of the goodness of fit hypothesis has generally been noted. 
Alternative explanatory variables should also be addressed. The political salience of an EU directive is 
likely to condition its output and outcome. Essentially, salience denotes a relatively heightened attention 
from decision makers dedicated to a specific issue. The amplified considerations can be based, inter alia, 
on a subject’s estimated policy impact, its political sensitivity or the attention it receives from core 
constituencies (Warntjen 2012: 169). The institutional misfit between the Danish system and the 
provisions of the Directive are likely to result in greater attention dedicated to the Directive in Denmark. 
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We thus expect the Directive to be more salient in Denmark compared with Bulgaria because it potentially 
implies more change of national policies.    
In the literature, the central premise of salience has been linked to other concepts, such as political 
sensitivity (Steunenberg & Kaeding 2009), conflict (König & Luetgert 2009) and controversy (De Wilde 
2011). However, all of these concepts denote an increased attention from decision makers and are 
therefore inextricably connected to the idea of issue salience. The literature has also emphasised the 
complexity behind measuring salience. Warntjen warns that salience is a fluctuating phenomenon with 
varying levels across policy fields and political actors, i.e., different issues affect different participants in 
the political process in different ways (Warntjen 2012: 169). This observation also holds true across 
political systems. Some issues are important in some countries, whereas they go unnoticed in others 
(Dimitrova & Toshkov 2009: 4). 
Here, the literature does not agree regarding how salience conditions transposition. Knill and Versluis link 
the lack of salience in legislative proposals with untimely transposition and insufficient implementation. 
The lack of attention from decision makers is associated here with a lack of incentive for reform (Versluis 
2007: 63). Spendzharova and Versluis reach a similar conclusion (Spendzharova & Versluis 2013: 1500). 
In contrast, Dimitrova and Toshkov find that the lack of salience results in timely transposition (Dimitrova 
& Toshkov 2009: 11). Because of this discrepancy in the literature, we leave for further examination how 
the high salience we expect for Denmark conditions output and outcome.     
Finally, we consider resources a conditioning factor for transposition output. This consideration is another 
dimension in which our two cases can be distinguished. Denmark is among the richest member states of 
the European Union, whereas Bulgaria is the poorest. We can therefore expect that the resources allocated 
in the course of transposition will enable a better transposition in Denmark than in Bulgaria. Table 1 
provides a short overview of the considerable differences that exist in the resource base of the two 
systems. 
Table 1 to be inserted here 
Obviously, Bulgaria lags considerably behind Denmark in every aspect of resource availability. The 
importance of resources has been recognised by several studies in the field (Börzel, et al. 2010; Falkneret 
al. 2008; Vasev & Vrangbæk 2014; Zubek & Staronova 2010). The resource hypothesis is connected to the 
basic understanding that resources allow for a more prompt, comprehensive and better implementation 
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of policies because exhaustive implementation of EU policies costs money (Hille & Knill 2006: 539). 
Resource-strapped administrations, in contrast, are more likely to decline minimalistic transposition 
because they simply cannot afford a different approach.  
 
Aims and instruments of the patient rights directive 
The patient rights directive is not easy to read. It expresses considerable ambiguity because, on the one 
hand, it intends to consolidate free movement principles in the healthcare sector; on the other hand, it 
respects the healthcare competences of the member states (Vollaard & Martinsen 2014: 718). The overall 
idea of the Directive has at least the following three components: 1) to allow free movement of goods, 
services and persons in cross border healthcare; 2) to establish legal certainty and ensure clarity 
concerning the rights of European patients in the cross border provisions of healthcare; and 3) to enable 
patients to make an informed choice regarding the provisions of healthcare in other member states. 
However, the underlying national concern has also been given considerable weight in the Directive, 
allowing member states various grounds to deny patients to go abroad for healthcare treatment (Greer 
2013: 417). 
Several articles are important instruments to realise the European aims of the Directive. Below, the 
institutional output of six key articles will be examined, and we analyse how they have been transposed in 
the two member states. During the conducted interviews, these six articles were noted as challenging to 
the established status quo of national healthcare provisions across the EU, although to different degrees 
and to varying extent across the member states. Articles 4, 5 and 6 intend to establish adequate and 
accessible information for patients to make an informed choice regarding cross border healthcare. Article 
7 addresses clear pricing. Article 8 establishes when and how prior authorisation is a justifiable means of 
national control for cross border care. Article 11 requires the mutual recognition of prescriptions, thus 
allowing patients to purchase medicine in other member states in accordance with the reimbursement 
policies of their member state of affiliation. Table 2 demonstrates the likely implications of the articles 
concerning output and outcome.      
Table 2 to be inserted here 




Keeping the gates: Transposing cross border health care in Denmark  
The Danish healthcare model belongs to the Beveridge NHS family, is primarily tax-financed and provides 
universal public healthcare for all residents. Providing healthcare is a shared responsibility among the 
state, the five regions and the 98 municipalities (Martinsen & Vrangbaek 2008: 173). Denmark has a long 
tradition of decentralisation of the healthcare sector. However, over the last decade, a considerable 
centralisation has been noticeable because of structural reforms and the introduction of performance 
management principles to the sector. Regional autonomy to prioritise and plan capacity have been 
primarily reduced by the following two patient rights granted by the state (Vrangbæk 1999): 1) the 
introduction of choice, which allows patients to access treatment in other regions; and 2) waiting time 
guarantees, creating a free choice of hospitals outside one’s own region (see further details below). Other 
elements of planning and controlling capacity remain an integral part of the Danish system. The ‘family 
doctor’, i.e., the General Practitioner (GP), is an important gatekeeper for healthcare treatment and has 
been regarded as important to the quality of care by bridging patients’ demands and system supply. The 
GP thus has an important control function in the Danish system, including access to pharmaceuticals 
through prescriptions, referring patients to specialist treatment and hospital care, ensuring the continuity 
of care, and providing information on care, among other factors. In performing these tasks, the GP has an 
equally important function in the system: controlling healthcare expenditures. The GP refers patients to 
specialised care and hospital care. A patient, once referred by the GP, has an extended free choice of 
hospital care if s/he cannot be treated within one month in his/her own region. In this case, the patient 
can chose healthcare at a public hospital in another region or at a private or foreign healthcare provider 
with which the Danish regions have established a previous agreement. The waiting time for hospital care 
is currently short because of this extended free choice.  
 
Transposing the patient rights Directive in Denmark 
In Denmark, the Ministry of Health was responsible for the transposition of the Directive, whereas the 
regions and healthcare providers were responsible for the practical implementation of it. The regions 
expressed frustration at not being closely involved in the transposition process, which mainly involved 
few civil servants in the Ministry of Health (Interviews, November 2012). The preparation of the law to 
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transpose the Directive was delayed several times, but the proposed law was finally presented in late June 
2013 and proposed to the Parliament in October 2013. The Danish law entered into force on 1 January 
2014, meaning that Denmark did not meet the transposition deadline of 25th October 2013.  
Danish transposition of the Directive has generally intended to limit its outcome. This domestic objective 
has produced a largely protectionist output demonstrated by the way the six key articles have been 
transposed. Currently, Danish patients can access considerable information regarding the quality of care 
and waiting times. However, this information is developed in a Danish context and is not immediately 
comparable across borders. Thus, the amount of information will not enable Danish patients to make an 
informed cross border choice. Concerning the inflow of foreign patients, there are linguistic limitations. 
For the relevant dissemination of information, the role of the contact points is considered crucial but 
unclear (Interviews, November 2012, July 2013, August 2013). Contact points with a high level of services 
are likely to cause an enhanced inflow of foreign patients, whereas lower service quality is likely to limit 
de facto patient flow and simultaneously increase uncertainty. The transposing law requires each region 
to establish a contact point. However, these contact points were created by using the already existing 
patient supervisor offices in the regions instead of establishing new institutions. In addition, a 
coordinating function of the five contact points is placed in the National Agency for Patients' Rights and 
Complaints, or ‘patientombuddet’ in Danish (Danish law proposal, L 33 as adopted 20. December 2013).  
Currently, the public sector is not sufficiently prepared for incoming patients (Interviews, July 2013, 
August 2013). Healthcare providers do not fulfil their obligation to provide adequate information 
concerning their services. Healthcare providers are required not to discriminate against foreign patients. 
However, the webpage on the main Danish hospital – Rigshospitalet – simply states that 
“Regrettably Rigshospitalet does not have the necessary capacity to offer treatment to private and/or foreign 
patients, even if they are willing to pay for their treatment themselves” (see 
http://www.rigshospitalet.dk/RHenglish/Menu/Diseases+and+Conditions/Private+patients/, accessed January 
2014).  
 
In contrast, regional authorities are required to make healthcare providers comply with their EU 
obligations, but they are unsure how to perform this monitoring function (Interviews, October 2014). 
Therefore, although Denmark is regarded as potentially attractive to foreign patients with low waiting 
times and a perception of relatively high-quality healthcare, a considerable patient inflow should not be 
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expected as an outcome. Furthermore, inflow is impeded by the lack of market logic in the public sector. 
‘Clear pricing’ is not straightforward for the Danish model. The Ministry of Health has decided to use DRG 
prices as tariffs, thus turning to existing solutions (Interviews, August and November 2012). However, 
representatives from the regions have noted that the DRG is an abstract means of price setting, which 
neither disaggregates the different components of a healthcare service nor specifies when a healthcare 
treatment begins and ends (Ibid.). DRG prices may function in a national setting where regions and 
national healthcare providers have learned to trust this price mechanism. However, in an internal market, 
DRG prices scarcely constitute transparent or full prices (ibid.).  
Considering article 8 regarding prior authorisation, the government, in strong support of the regions, has 
not liberally permitted the outflow of Danish patients – but maintains the prior authorisation policy. For 
hospital care and ‘highly specialized and high cost care’ not requiring hospitalisation, authorisation must 
be issued (Danish law proposal, L 33 as adopted 20. December 2013; § 89). The law requires the Danish 
Health and Medicines Authority to issue a list that establishes which treatments require prior 
authorisation. The issued list determines that all treatments requiring at least one night of hospitalisation 
and all treatments listed in the ‘plan for specialization’ (‘specialeplanen’) require authorisation. The list 
simply links to the ‘plan for specialization’ where a somewhat overwhelming range of treatments appear, 
including several requiring minor specialisation.1 There is no further justification for why this entire 
range of treatments require authorisation. In addition, the government has refused to issue a positive list 
of what treatments can be accessed directly without prior certification from the Danish health authorities 
(see the Minister of Health’s response to question 27, additional report from the Health Committee of the 
Danish Parliament, 18 December 2013). To date, the practice of issuing prior authorisation has been 
clearly restrictive, estimated to be only approximately 10 each year across the country from 2011-2012 
(Interviews, April 2012, November 2012, August 2013).      
Article 11, which establishes the mutual recognition of prescription, may have the highest impact on 
Danish healthcare. Medicine can now be purchased in other member states and reimbursed at the same 
level as if it had been purchased in Demark. Because medicine is relatively expensive in Denmark, Danish 
patients are incentivised to buy pharmaceuticals across the borders or through the internet. In addition, it 
will be increasingly difficult for the GP to control access to medicine because it can be prescribed by GPs in 
other member states.  
                                                          
1
 See https://sundhedsstyrelsen.dk/da/sundhed/planlaegning-og-beredskab/specialeplanlaegning/specialeplan-
2010, accessed January 2014. 
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Despite its salience, there was no extensive public discussion of the proposal and no major political 
disagreements on how to transpose. However, the liberal parties ‘Venstre’ and ‘Liberal Alliance’ criticised 
the Social Democratic government for not addressing the market opportunities that the Directive could 
offer the Danish healthcare sector and for adopting overly restrictive control measures through prior 
authorisation (Additional report from the Health committee of the Danish Parliament, 18 December 
2013). However, these criticisms did not prevent the two parties from voting for the proposal.  All parties, 
except for the left wing party ‘Enhedslisten’, voted for the proposal, and the law was adopted on 20 
December 2013. Even the Danish People’s Party, the EU’s sceptical right-wing party, which generally 
argues strongly against EU cross border welfare, warning against ‘welfare tourism’, voted for the proposal. 
Thus, contrary to our expectation that the salience of the Directive should be high in Denmark because of 
considerable misfit, salience was low. There was no major opposition to the transposition of the Directive, 
no important parliamentary or public debate, and the government enjoyed considerable autonomy in how 
to transpose. De facto, the salience of the Directive was low.    
 
Concerning ‘resources’ expected to cause different transposition output in Denmark and Bulgaria, our 
analysis on the Danish transposition demonstrates a need to distinguish between ‘available resources’ and 
‘allocated resources’. Available resources are relatively high in Denmark, whereas the resources allocated 
to transposition were low. No extra manpower and only limited resources were allocated to the regional 
contact points for performing the new functions. In contrast, the regions note that although there may be a 
limited number of inquiries from patients, all inquiries are complex and demanding. The Directive is 
complex to counsel on, and all patient situations differ (Interviews, October 2014). No routines or general 
practices have been established. Administering the new rules in practice are considered highly resource 
demanding (Ibid.). Against this background, allocated resources have been criticised as inadequate and 
can be viewed as a minimalist approach to the functions that the institutions must perform (Interview, 
August 2013; hearing response by the Danish Regions as of 16 August 2013). With a low level of allocated 
resources, the regions have less ability to fulfil the goals of the Directive.    
Denmark has transposed with caution and in a protectionist manner, thus preventing significant 
outcomes of the Directive. The outcomes in the long term depend on how the Commission will respond to 
and monitor Danish implementation and how patients, interest organisations and private providers drive 
the application of the rules. Currently, Danish transposition does not meet the threefold goals of the 
Directive, namely, to allow free movement within the healthcare sector, establish legal certainty or enable 
patients to make an informed, cross border choice. A high degree of institutional misfit explains in part the 
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restrictive Danish transposition, but the two other causal mechanisms can also explain the Danish output 
because both salience and allocated resources are low in Denmark, despite our theoretical expectations.  
 
From a healthcare periphery: Transposing cross border healthcare in Bulgaria 
In contrast to its Danish counterpart, the Bulgarian system is a Social Health Insurance (SHI) system. 
Traditionally, the coverage in these systems reflects the level of the patients’ employment, but currently, 
SHI systems offer almost universal coverage to their patients because participation in the system is 
obligatory. In the Bulgarian system, there is a reciprocal concentration of power compared with the 
Danish system. Although the healthcare provision infrastructure comprises 28 Regional Health Insurance 
Funds (RHIF), they exercise little autonomy and are almost entirely subject to the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF), the exclusive health insurance fund in the country. Since its introduction in 1999, 
the NHIF has been responsible for collecting health insurance contributions, contracting hospitals and 
covering patients’ expenses in the contracted healthcare providers. Between the NHIF and the Ministry of 
Health, which is centrally involved in the preparation of legislation and the budget of the NHIF, the 
Bulgarian health system is characterised by a minimal number of healthcare actors, and the majority of 
the power is concentrated between the Ministry and the NHIF.   
In Bulgaria, the prices of the treatments are listed in an annually negotiated National Framework Contract 
(NFC). Prices for treatments included in the basic benefit package are listed in the National Framework 
Contract. When providers are contracted by the NHIF, their contract determines what treatment they 
must offer to insured patients (Dimova et al. 2012: 19). The NFC is mostly determined by the Ministry and 
the NHIF. However, the prices in the NFC do not reflect the market evaluation. This discrepancy is 
connected to decreased purchasing power in the country. Ultimately, the costs are assumed by the 
healthcare providers and patients. For patients, their high participation in covering some of the 
treatments is reflected in the high shares of Out of Pocket Payment (OPP). For health providers, this 
obligation results in considerable indebtedness. The deficiency of funds means that the majority of 
Bulgarian healthcare is characterised by a decreased quality of services. Although low prices may appear 
conducive to an inflow of foreign patients, low quality standards are prohibitive. Similar to the Danish 
system, the general practitioner plays a central role. The GP has controlling functions because a referral 
from him or her is required to access an outpatient specialist. After the patient visits a specialist, the 
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specialist can issue an additional referral for hospitalisation if needed. Thus, the GPs control access to the 
system because a referral is required to see a specialist and/or obtain hospitalisation.  
 
Transposing the patient rights directive in Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, the transposition failed in meeting its deadline because of the political instabilities preceding 
the adoption of the Directive. From February 2013, the country experienced instability when the 
incumbent government was forced to resign, an interim government assumed control, and finally, a new 
government was elected. This disorder was accompanied by continuous popular protests demanding the 
resignation of the government. These protests put the focus on national legislation and side lined 
transposition procedures. Therefore, the political environment prior to the adoption of the Directive was 
relatively unstable, and this ultimately resulted in a delay in the transposition. The adverse effect of the 
protests was emphasised by the fact that there was effectively no political opposition to the Directive’s 
adoption in parliament. Only two members of parliament abstained in the vote, and there were no votes 
against it. The transposition of the Directive in Bulgaria mirrors the situation in Denmark. The 
parliamentary discussion proceeded without contestation, and there were no public debates concerning 
the Directive.  Media attention was also limited. Similar to Denmark, salience became low.   
The new law was adopted on the 19th of December 2013 and was officially published as a law on 
December 27. In late March 2014, the Ministry of Health published an ordinance that contains provisions 
for the detailed implementation of the Directive.  The new laws designate the NHIF as the single National 
Contact Point that relies on the existing structures of the NHIF without creating a new institution.  At the 
time of this writing, no information concerning the NHIF’s new obligations has appeared on the website of 
the Fund. The rest of the information on the NHIF’s website is detailed, offering information on not only 
patients’ rights but also the NFC and other central elements of the health system. However, this 
information was available prior to the transposition, and the Directive has contributed little to influence 
its availability. It is also likely that information will be only in Bulgarian because the English version of the 
site is currently parsimonious. Thus, information provided by the NHIF has scarcely been influenced by 
the Directive. This limited information will impede patient flows.   
For the NHIF, the greatest challenge in the establishment of the contact point is the shortage of human and 
technical resources (Interview, February 2014). Neither the new law nor the Ministry ordinance 
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designates any extra resources for the establishment of the new structures necessary for the proper 
functioning of the National Contact Point. This deficiency reflects the low amount of allocated resources 
for the establishment of the new institution. This low amount of allocated resources will cause difficulties 
if the inflow of foreign or the outflow of Bulgarian patients increases.  
Regarding the provisions concerning the assurance of adequate information on healthcare standards and 
treatment options, the Bulgarian system is well equipped. The services covered by the NHIF are listed 
annually in the NFC. In addition, the treatment of patients is regulated through clinical pathways. These 
pathways resemble the diagnosis related groups (DRG) used in Denmark. Although there have been 
attempts for years to reform the Bulgarian system to replace the pathways with DRG, clinical pathways 
remain the standard in Bulgaria, and they provide considerable information on prices and treatment 
options. Currently, most of the Bulgarian hospitals include this information on their websites, with several 
hospitals offering the information in English. The transposition law does not impose any requirements on 
health providers to deliver information in foreign languages.  
Тhe Ministry ordinance explicitly prohibits health providers from charging foreign patients different 
prices than Bulgarian patients. This prohibition, however, does not end the issue. Bulgarian healthcare 
prices are artificially kept low and do not represent the market value of the services (Interview, November 
2013). This discrepancy creates more of an issue for Bulgarian patients because under the Directive, the 
reimbursed costs will reflect a preternaturally low level. Furthermore, if Bulgarian patients find a system 
where prices are lower than in Bulgaria, the Ministry ordinance precludes a Bulgarian patient receiving 
more money than he or she paid. Interviews with officials in the Ministry of Health noted this issue as the 
primary concern for the authorities. Thus, the ordinance prevents any possible ‘medical tourism’. 
However, the ordinance also leaves Bulgarian patients significantly disadvantaged. Due to the artificially 
low pricing of treatment in Bulgaria, patients will actually incur considerable expenses if they undertake 
treatment abroad because the difference between foreign prices and Bulgarian coverage can be 
considerable.  
The list of treatments included in the positive list that require prior authorisation is remarkably short. The 
list contains 15 treatments, which are also some of the highest priced treatments in Bulgaria, i.e., cardio-
related treatments. Thus, the government has used the provisions in the Directive to restrict mobility for 
the highest priced treatments. This restriction protects not only the Bulgarian system from financial 
exposure but also the interests of medical lobbies that control the pricing of these treatments.   
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The Directive’s provisions regarding mutual recognition of prescriptions, which allow cross border access 
to medicine, are also likely to be problematic in the Bulgarian system. Although the Ministry ordinance 
provides rules for the reimbursement of pharmaceuticals, the reality of the Bulgarian healthcare system 
creates impediments to the reimbursement of medication. Because of the small size and the low prices of 
the Bulgarian pharmaceutical market, many pharmaceutical companies have discontinued their supply to 
it. Because pharmaceutical companies calculate prices for their products with formulae that involve a 
comparison of prices in all of Europe, Bulgaria’s presence in these calculations decreases the prices in 
other countries. Therefore, companies find it more profitable to exclude Bulgaria from their supply, which 
leaves Bulgaria with relatively less medications available than in the rest of the EU. In the context of the 
Directive, this shortage could create a situation where Bulgarian patients return to Bulgaria with recipes 
for medications that are unavailable in Bulgaria. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that Bulgarian 
patients increasingly go to Greece or Romania for pharmaceuticals.  
Bulgaria has transposed in a relatively minimalist manner, leading to a restrictive output. Although its 
Bismarcian healthcare model has a better fit from a general, overall perspective than the NHS model in 
Denmark, Bulgaria has many underlying difficulties in complying with the goals of the Directive. These 
meso-level incompatibilities are revealed when one examines the quality of transposing individual 
articles, which was conducted in the analysis above. Similar to Denmark, both salience and allocated 
resources in Bulgaria’s transposition were low. In particular, we found low resources to explain the 
restrictive output and low outcome of the Directive.  
 
Conclusions  
The juxtaposition of the Danish and the Bulgarian systems’ transposition of the Cross-Border Patients’ 
Rights Directive utilises the benefits of the most different systems design to elucidate analogous outcomes 
of two dissimilar polities conditioned by comparable factors. The distinctions between the systems and 
different saliences and resources led us to expect different transposition outputs and outcomes. However, 
our research has established that low salience and a low level of allocated resources had a comparable 
impact on both systems.  
Salience in both Denmark and Bulgaria was relatively low. Few actors were involved and engaged in the 
transposition process. Public debate was absent; therefore, outside input was limited. Although we 
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expected that the greater misfit between the Directive and the Danish system would result in greater 
debate, this was not the result. Similar to Bulgaria, the Danish transposition occurred largely without 
parliamentary debate and notice to society, which enabled decision makers to limit its potential impact by 
approving a protectionist and restrictive transposition. 
The decisively higher resources in Denmark should have yielded a better transposition in the system. 
However, the transposition in Denmark emphasised an important distinction in the significance of 
resources as a condition for transposition: the Danish case demonstrates the need to distinguish between 
available and allocated resources. Although available resources may be high, allocated resources can be 
limited, which can restrict transposition. In Bulgaria, the limited amount of both available and allocated 
resources is to be expected. In contrast, in the Danish case, the limited amount of allocated resources is a 
central cause of a lower quality transposition. Low salience and limited allocated resources result in an 
essentially protectionist transposition in Denmark and a minimalist transposition in Bulgaria. 
Transposition output was thus restrictive in both member states, which we determined was likely to 
produce a low outcome, i.e., inflow and/or outflow of patients. Our preliminary findings concerning 
outcomes confirm this assumption, as demonstrated in table 3 below.  
Insert table 3 here   
Up to October 2014, reimbursement of cross border care for outflowing patients from Denmark and 
Bulgaria have remained low. Thirty-five patients have been reimbursed from the Danish authorities, and 
only 4 have been reimbursed in Bulgaria. We have no data on prior authorisation in Bulgaria granted 
before 2014, but we know that it was approximately 10 per year in Denmark. Although the numbers have 
increased in Denmark, we still consider this a low outcome of an EU law, designed and negotiated in great 
detail, negotiated for a long time and intending to facilitate access to cross-border healthcare in the EU. 
Data on the inflow of patients are not available. According to the respondents, this information will be 
difficult to obtain because healthcare providers largely control it, without much intervention from 
national or regional authorities (Interviews, October 2014). 
The future implications remain to be seen. Thus far, the encounter between the European Union and the 
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Table 1: Resources available in the Danish and Bulgarian healthcare sector 
 Denmark Bulgaria 
GDP per capita in USD 56,364 6,977 
Health expenditure per capita 
(current US$) 
6,304 516 
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) 11.2 7.4 
Health expenditure, public (% of total 
health expenditure) 
85.5 56.3 
















Table 2: Six key articles of the Patients’ Rights Directive 
Article Content Implications 
4 & 5  MS are obliged to 
ensure that information is provided on 
healthcare standards, treatment options, 
availability, quality and safety, prices, 
rights, appeal procedures, etc.   
Output: MS and healthcare providers 
must develop accessible info and 
procedures where they are not available 
Outcome: Accessible info may enable 
citizens to make an informed choice. Will 
increase inflow and/or outflow   
6 MS to establish contact points Output: Obligation to develop this and 
ensure sufficient resources so that they 
can provide relevant information. 
Outcome: Contact points are a venue for 
information and comparison. Will 
increase inflow and/or outflow 
7  MS required to have transparent 
mechanisms for the calculation of costs 
Output: MS must develop prices and 
tariffs where they do not exist.  
Outcome: Venue for comparing inter-
regional prices and question differences. 




8 Prior authorisation (PA) justified for 
hospital care as well as highly specialized 
and cost-intensive care 
• PA must be issued where treatment 
cannot be granted within a medically 
justifiable time limit 
• MS of affiliation shall make publicly 
available which healthcare is subject 
to PA 
Output: MS must define and justify which 
healthcare services require PA. The use of 
PA must be necessary and proportionate. 
MS must deliver treatments within a 
justifiable time-limit, question waiting-
time and the ability to prioritize between 
treatments. 
Outcome: May increase inflow and/or 
outflow.  
11 Mutual recognition of prescriptions 
 
Output; procedures must be in place to 
accept prescriptions from other MS 
Outcome; Possible to access medicine in 







Table 3: Outflow of patients in Denmark and Bulgaria in accordance with the Patients’ Rights 
Directive between 1/1-2014 and 1/10-2014 
 Denmark Bulgaria 
Inquiries regarding cross-border 
healthcare since  
1/1-2014 
900 No data 
Applications for reimbursement 




prior authorisation since 1/1-2014  
Reimbursement for treatments 
that do not require prior 
authorisation since 1/1-2014 
21 2 
Applications for prior authorisation 
since 1/1-2014 
61 3 
Prior authorisation granted since  
1/1-2014 
14 2 
 
